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6PREFACE
The concept of usin g man as a. working component of a system was employed in the
United States Space Program. This paper discusses the application of this concept in
the development of one subsystem, the Acceptance Checkout Equipment for Spacecraft
(ACE-S/C). This paper also describes the principles and applications of these princi-
ples with an emphasis oil 	 reliability engineering practice that was Wised as a design
tool .
The preparation of this paper has been substantially assisted by the contributions
of Dr. John de S. COLItinllo, Otto H. Fedor, Edgar A. Beard, and other associates.
am particularly indebted to Dr. Kurt Debus, Director, Kennedy Space Center, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, for liis support and guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
From the United States Space Program, a new concept of man as part of a system
has evolved. Because of the schedule and operational constraints associated with the
Mercury and Apollo Programs, the application of this concept has resulted not so much
in the development of new equipment, as in new uses of available equipment. As addi-
tional projects develop, this concept could result in the development of new equipment
which could find wide and significant applications beyond the scope of the Space Pro-
gram.
Application of this concept in the development of one subsyFten-i, the Acceptance
Checkout Equipment for Spacecraft (ACE-S/C), will be discussed to illustrate the prin-
ciples involved. Various applications of these principles have made a significant con-
tribution to the success of the United States Space Program. Specifically, the applica-
tion of this concept has permitted mail to land successfully on the moon, knowing he had
only 3 seconds of fuel in reserve.
A dramatic test of the usefulness of the concept was provided during the Apollo 13
manned mission. After the tragic failure of the Service Module on the approach to the
moon, it was possible in a minimum of time, and in an optinuu» manner, to reprogram the
flight and utilize the resources still available to aciiieve a successful emergency return
to earth .
MAN IN SPACE
The United States Space Exploration Program was conceived as a comprehensive,
long-term program, encompassing both automatic and manned systems. Each type of
system has its inherent limitations; the intent is to employ that system which will best
satisfy the requiremer :Ls of a specific mission.
Because of the weight constraints associated with spacecraft, it is necessary to
take full advantage of the capabilities of every component included in the flight vehicle.
This principle also applies to man as a member of the flight crew, and to the cumulative
capabilities of the cre^.v ': that is, man 0 Ould be considered as an integral part of the
system, and every effort must be made to take maxinmmi advantage of the unique charac-
teristics he adds to the system. It follows that a manned system will have capabilities
not inherent in an automatic system.
The current concept of the role of man in a spacecraft is that of observer/analyzer
decision-maker. Man should not be reg l!ired to perform functions which can be accom-
plished more effectively by machines. Hence, the problem is to use these unique capa-
bilities of man Observation and decision-making) to extend the capabilities of equipment.
This has been the underlying concept which has been fostered throughout the Mercury
a„d Apollo Programs (Figure 1).
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6SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT
A manned space system is considered to consist of three basic elements: Hardware,
software, and mall.
For present purposes it is not necessary to define man or hardware. Software con-
sists of written analyses and procedures which define the relationship between man and
hardware within the system as required for mission accomplishment.
The integration of man into a space system presents a particular challenge. In
contrast to hardware, man possesses dynamic characteristics; He learns with experience.
As he learns, he becomes more effective, thus modifying the hardware and software
design requirements. It has not been possible to model man's learning characteristics.
The approach has been to build special-purpose simulators to integrate man, soft,.Nare,
and hardware; and, within selected and limited scopes, to develop Hardware and software
requirements based oil 	 changing capabilities. The Apollo Program was based r.n
the use of the most sophisticated simulators for crew and ground support personnel. How-
ever, because of practical deadlines, the approach could never lie followed to i". 71 final
conclusion. Those in the Space Program find themselves at the beginning of an exciting
new development.
Hardware can be classified from various viewpoints. A common classification is
the breakdown of hardware into flight and ground-based equipment. Flight hardware is
basically different from ground-based equipment because of the prime emphasis on
weight-effectiveness. Ground-based equipment includes all facilities and equipment
necessary to support the launch, fl ight, and retrieval of spacecraft.
An important element of the hardware system is the instrumentation. The ACE-
S/C is a subset of the instrumentation group and includes both flight and ground-based
equipment (Figure 2). The mission of the ACE-S/C is to provide for the adequate check-
out of manned spacecraft and experiments in the preparation area during prelaunch opera-
tions. The ACE-S/C subsystem provides assurance that the various onboard systems
are in operating order, and, in case of fail:.-re, pertinent information is presented in a
form to the human monitor so he can make decisions e • i the best use of available equip-
ment.
MONITORING REQUIREMENTS
Some of the design requirements applicable to the ACE-S/C were established for
the total instrumentation/monitoring package. To enable flight personnel to concentrate
on their duties of observation and decision-making, detail monitoring is accomplished to
the greatest possible extent by specialized yromid-based persomicl and instrumentation.
The monitoring encompasses the following classes of information:
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•1 . Operational parameters.
2. Indicators of the integrity of flight and critical ground support subsystems.
3. Indicators of the integrity of the instrumentation.
file operational parameters include those values necessary to control the progress
of flight operations, such as velocity and acceleration versus time, navigational i,ifor-
nnation, fuel and oxygen management, etc. These parameters are of interest to both the
flight crew and to ground advisory personnel, whose functions are to advise flight per-
sonnel on how to attain the best utilization of available equipment.
The indicators of the integrity of flight and critical ground support subsystems
provide the basis for the assessment of the operational ccndition of onboard and ground-
! ased equ : pment during ground and flight operations. Flight trews are interested in
information for this class only as may be necessary as a basis for their decision-making.
All details, however, are of interest to specialized gro ► md-based monitors.
GroUnd personnel also are interested specifically in the integrity of the instrumen-
tation to ensure that the operational information presented to flight personae! and ground
advisors is correct.
T,. same concept of the homan function developed for flight crews, namely that
man is an observer and decision-maker, is also applied to the ground monitors. The
ground monitor observes the real-time performance parameters of specific hardware ele-
ments and makes decisions which are communicated to the ground-based advisors. He
performs no functions which can be performed by available machines. This approach has
resulted in revolutionary new requirements for data processing and display. The appli-
cation of these concepts has led to the development of the ; ► p ique Unites States Space
Control Room (Figure 3).
The complete ACE-S/C subsystem, including the control room iFigure 4) consists
of a number of modules which provide for considerable opera t ional flexibility in testing
various systems at various subsystem levels. This flexibility is provided by a series of
major control loops containing a number of smaller control loops, mid these in turn con-
tain a number of lesser control loops. Provisions are made for manned intervention so
that selectable levels of automation can be attained. The standardization of data ele-
ments at the interfaces between modules has been a major design consideration. Since
it must be possible to monitor the spacecraft while it is in flight, the subsystem design
►nust be based on remote control and remote monitoring techniques.
The concept of man as a continuously operating decision-maker within a system
established a n°w set of requirements for the timely presentation and format of analyzed
data. In conventional fi ight test work, individual items of data such as readings of
temperatt!rls, accelerations, pressures, stresses, and deflections are telernetered and
recorded. Rooms full of data are accumulated. The speed with which these data are
analyzed depends on the facilities available for the analysis work; often the analyzed
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6results are available on' y weeks or months after completion of the test. This procedure
has been clmte satisfactory for aircraft programs, during which the test vehicles approach
critical llight conditions ill 	 steps, and which may require 1,500 flight test hours
to reach Bill development.
These conventional l.rocedhres first proved inadequate on the Mercury Program,
where some 2 miles of taped data was being accurnllated per launch. Subsequent anal-
yses proved to be of I ittle value; the need was to recognize conditions as they were
occurring so that in case of i°regularities they could be recognized and immediate action
cuuld be taken.
This need re presented a new requirement for data to be analyzed immediately in
real tune upon acquisition, and to be displayed in proper context with previous measure-
ments so [hat it wo;lld he meanin-lful to the human monitor. From the technical view-
point, the overriding design requirement was for the reduction to a minimum of the pro-
cessing time for data acquisition, integration with historical data, and the complete
analysis and the display of all pertinent information, so that it appears as real time to
the observing monitor.
The instrumentation system evolved into three basic functional groupings:
1. The Command or Uplink Systeii.
2. The Moaitoring or Downlink System.
3. The System Software (automation) .
The requirement for the display of real-time information to test and operations 	 I
personnel presented a new and revolutionary design challenge. The remainder of this
paper will discuss the ACE-S/C; that is, the equipment dedicated to the monitoring of	 I
the integrity of flight hardware.
ACE-S/C
The primary function of the ACE-S/C subsystem is monitoring the integrity of
spacecraft fli(Iht equipment; however, the effective perfamiance of this function also
requires the monitoring of the integrity o, the associated i nstrumentation. The subsys-
tem is compatible with all other elements of the total instr lmentation syster .
A highly simplified diagram of the ACE-S/C subsystem is shown in Figure 5. The
spacecraft is shown in the flight mode; it is therefore necessary for all data to be tele-
metered. All telemetry is base(! on dig i tal technology; the same is true for all data
transfer at subsystem interfaces. When the spacecraft is on the ground, data acquisi-
tion is accomplished by means of cabies which are disconnected just prior to liftoff.
Re-used cabies provide a much more effective capability for fault isolation than can be
provided by a telemetry iink. This is of signif;cance during the complete checkout which
is performed just prior to launch to ensure that all systems are G0.
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•For simplicity, Figure 5 shows only two equipment/instrumentation packages in
the spacecraft, and three display consoles. Actually, there are approximately 11 moni-
tored systems in the flight vehicle, acid 11 groups of display consoles.
All monitoring personnel are representatives of cognizant systems engineering
groups and may initiate tests through the command link. Tests may also be prepro-
grammed for automatic execution, either periodically or continuously. However, the
monitors are in control of all tests at all times, and may select various testing modes,
such as: manual, manual; semi-automatic, or automatic with ovLaide. This flexible
capability is essential under conditions which are constantly and progressively changing.
Commands for tests from all consoles are Collected and presented at a central
ground-based Diagnostic Program Center and relayed to the Onboard Command System in
Me spacecraft.
The Onboard Command System executes the commands received, including those
for preprogrammed self-checks, and relays the self-test data hack to the central, ground-
based Data Processor. The response data and the routine opera+ional and environmental
data are also transmitted to the ground-based Data Processor by the monitoring link.
The data received by the Data Processor is reduced and collated with all previously
acquired data which is stored in the Library (Central Data Bank). The status of all com-
mand and monitored data is recorded in the Library and kept available for real-time retrie-
val . The status of all critical or pertinent parameters is transmitted continuously in
real time and Al meaningful engineering units to the proper display units. Information is
presented immediately in decisive form to test and operations personnel, enabling quick
decisions in a highly significant and dynamic situation.
The displays are designed to present information in such a planner as to reduce the
manipulative load on monitoring personnel as much as possible, to free them for their
main decision-making functions, and to increase the confidence in the monitoring pro-
gr2,n. The real-time processing is provided to allow immediate detection of changes in
active data channels, to provide data by exception, and to identify potentially signifi-
cant trends. The same reasoning is Used in providing for automatic self-checks, cali-
brations, validations, Continuous limit checks, out-of-tolerance indications, and signif-
icant trends. Every effort is made to permit recognition of gradual degradation and the
timely initiation of corrective actions to avoid catastrophic failures.
Monitoring personnel also have free access to the Library and may retrieve in real
time any previous data stored there to support their trend analyses. Provisions are made
for independent Lesting from separate locations, at the option of test personnel .
Monitoring personnel maintain close oral communications with one another and
with the Flight Dire tor, who in birn also maintains continuous COIIIIIIIInICation with the
10
kastronaut in the spacecraft. None of the monitoring functions interfere with normal astro-
naut activity during operational modes.
The implementation of these concepts requires the integration of spacecraft and
monitoring equipment; that is, each piece of onboard operating equipment must be
designed so that its critical parameters call 	 monitored by the ACE-S/C devices.
Subsystems and systems are analyzed during design to determine all potential fail-
ure points and possible failure modes (Reference 1). Provisions must be made for inde-
pendent subsystem testing, integrated systems testing, and testing across systems inter-
faces. The parameters to be monitored will vary with the type and function of the
equipment and the characteristics of the potential failure.
The prerecorded test programs are utilized to simulate critical functions and poten-
tial failures, and to exercise critical components. III 	 case of a system or subsystem
failure, the test routines follow the plans developed in the fault-tree analysis (Refer-
ence 2), which as far as practicable isolates the failed device and pinpoints the failed
components. III 	 the ACE-S/C design, prime consideration was given to
the requirement for on-time launching, to be accomplished in full public view. The
ACE-S/C development time was established by the spacecraft schedule, and therefore,
emphasis was placed on adherence to rigid schedules and fundings. Commercial and
other existing equipment was utilized whenever available, and the necessary reliability
had to be achieved by the use of redundant techniques rather than by sophisticated design.
Available commercial equipment was invariably designed for other applications and was
usually not completely suitable to satisfy the requirements of the ACE-S/C subsystem.
It was therefore not possible under these circumstances to achieve an optimum design.
The greatest difficulties were encountered in meeting the telemetry requirements,
and particularly the stringent weight requirements applicable to onboard equipment. In
the beginning of the program, power line transients in the public power supply caused
voltage transients and wave form distortions; it became necessary to provide battery
backup for the onboard equipment, and to power the ground system by use of diesel genera=
tors. Tile removal of the test cables from the spacecraft had to be accomplished without
invalidating the onboard systems. The accuracy of the instrumentation also presented a
problem. Available instrumentation is designed to measure operational p arameters with
ail 	 required for navigation and guidance. This accuracy is not al'.,ays adequate
for the measurements required for trend analysis and for monitoring the integrity of the
instrumentation itself.
A large number of papers have been published describing the various subsystems
and equipment comprising the ACE-S/C; it serves no purpose to repeat such det, i:5 here.
References 3 and 4 are representative of those publications.
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RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Compliance with the reliability requirements for the ACE-S/C constituted an over-
riding major design consideration. The requirements for the ACE-S/C subsystem were
derived from those for the Apollo Program.
Since there was no precedent for the Apollo Program, there were also no accepted
guidelines for establishing reliability requirements. Now that the initial flights of the
Apollo Program have been successful, the associated requirements will provide a base-
line for use on all future programs.
The final Apollo reliability requirements were based on the inputs of many studies.
The development of a representative early inl^,ut is described in Reference 5 as follows.
In ail
	
to determine a moraily acceptable level of risk to which a man may be sub-
jected, a quantitative study was made of the probability of survival of U.S  . Navy carrier-
based pilots, both during peacetime and wartime flight operations. There appeared to be
no significant difference between the peacetime and wartime results. At first, this result
was surprising until it was realized that85 to 95 percent of all wartime flight operations
consist of the same training exercises as in peacetime, to keep pilots at top proficiency.
This study led to further statistical research involving the probabilities of survival
at the Indianapolis Racetrack and the Mexico City Bullfighting Ring. These topics were
selected because of the high risks associated with these activities as well as the cultural
differences, and the different nature of the risks. The results were again surprising in
that they indicated that the probability of survi 3 al at Indianapo' is was about the same as
at Mexico City. Both risks were an order of magnitude higher than those required of a
naval carrier pilot.
Although the scope of this research was limited, it led to a number of tentative
conclusions. At Indianapolis as well as at Mexico City, the risks are determined
exclusively by the actions of the participants; the individual himself determines the
magnitude of the risks in a series of successive trade-offs between risk and glory.
The glory accruing to the naval carrier pilot is not as great as that accorded to the vic-
tor at Indianapolis or Mexico City; he cannot be subjected to the same level of risk.
For the Apollo Program, it was decided that the glory which would accrue to a
volunteer astronaut as a result of a successful round trill 	 the moon would be much
greater than any which he could win in earth-basedevents. Right or wrong, it was decided
that manned spaceflight legitimately and morally may be associated with risks greater
than those measured at Indianapolis and Mexico City. This type of thinking influenced
the establishment of the original reliability requirements for the Apollo Program, which
now provides the precedent for requirements for future systems.
The Apollo Program reliability requirements were apportioned to the various sub-
systems by means of accepted techniques such as those described in Reference 2. These
12
k
techniques are based on the use of the product rule. The following three quantitative
requirements were apportioned to the ACE-SjC subsystem:
Hardware Reliability:
	
Rh = 0.9995
Operational Reliability: Ro = 0.99995
Crew Safety:	 Rs = 0.999995
These numbers are applicable to the originally proposed 72-11our mission. The
term "Hardware Reliability" refers to the capability of the subsystem hardware, operat-
ing under the specified design conditions. "Operational Reliability" refers to the proba-
bility of mission success of the man-machine assembly and considers the use of degraded
operating modes. "Crew Safety" takes into consideration the redundancies p rovided by
emergency standby subsystems which provide the astronauts with means for escape in
case of mission abort.
In conjunction with quantitative requirements, it is necesary to establ ish demon-
stration test policies. These numbers are so large that the use of conventional demon-
stration techniques is not feasible. In this situation, it was decided to speak of design
"goals" rather than "requirements," and to establish modified demonstration procedures.
For all design decisions, it was required that attainment of the goals be demonstrated
analytically, following standard procedures (Reference 2) based on published data and
selected component and element test results. To standardize the computations, the goals
for the 72-11our mission were expressed in the equivalent terms for a 1-hour mission and
converted to Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Titus, the subsystem Hardware Relia-
bility requirement:
RI, = 0.9995 (for a 1-11our mission)
converts to a design goal of
MTBF h
 — 2,000 hours
This conversion permitted all calculations and test results to be expressed in con-
ventionai units.
A test plan was established to demonstrate, whenever feasible, the validity of the
design assumptions and of analytical conclusions. Normally, such tests could not demon-
strate attainment of reliability goals; however, they could and did demonstrate in certain
instances that the goals had not been attained and that further design effort was indicated.
In particular, this program included special-purpose tests as well as all development
tests, system integration tests, and reliability monitoring of activation, prelaunch, and
flight operations. In situations where such high reliability figures are involved, it is
e
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essential to establish an evaluation system which will not neglect to make use of every
bit of data which becomes available in all types of operations.
In addition to the quantitative requirements, it was necessary to establish a number
of configuration requirenlents which affected reliability. All potential single point fail-
ures had to be identified and eliminated to the greatest extent possible. The established
design policy specified that no single failure should produce a subsystem failure.
For each potential component or element failure, either catastrophic or degradation,
the resulting degraded operating mode was identified and it was determined to what extent
the degraded mode could still support the accomplishment of the mission.
Since weight and space requirements are not critical on ground-based equipment,
heavy emphasis was placed oil the selectiuii of commercial or other eqiiipment which had
a prior history of successful operation.
In the discussion that follows, both the design and reliability problems that existed
at the project initiation will be described, followed by an explanation of the approach
that was taken to meet the assigned goals.
DESIGNING FOR OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY
The reliability implications of a complex high-performance, computer-controlled
checkout system ( , ajhich was to be the only link between the spacecraft and the test engi-
neers for command and control, and for data collection, processing, and display) dictated
a unique design approach that would yield a systems design with a reliability that would
exceed the intrinsic reliability of the component parts. In addition to hardware reliability
goals of 0.9995, the operational reliability requirenlent was 0.99995 for mission suc-
cess, and 0.999995 for crew safety. The 0.9995 converts to an equivalent 1-hour
MTBF of 2,000 hours for the entire system. A design utilizing six or more major sub-
systems in series established a design requirement for each subsystem to have a pre-
dicted equivalent 1-11our MTBF approaching 100,000 hours (approximately 12 years).
The design concept was to utilize commercially available egUIlrnent, and the opera-
tional concept required non-catastrophic failure modes and a design that would degrade
in a controlled manner.
The state of the art of component reliability as it existed during the initial design
phase is described here in order to facilitate understanding of the options that were avail-
able to the designer in achieving the required MTBF's for the ACE-S/C subsystem. At 	 N
that time, an electronic system containing a few hundred discrete electronic parts with a
MTBF of 2,000 hours was considered most satisfactory. Application of the same design
techniques and the same discrete components would yield decreasing equipment reliability
14
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with increasing equipment complexity (Figure 6 and Reference 6). To maintain MTBF
constant with increasing equipment complexity required a reduction in component part
failure rates. For example, to achieve the ACE-S/C 1-hoer equivalent MTBF's of
100,000 hours (assuming a system complexity of 125,e00 parts) would have required
a component part failure rate equivalent to one failure in 100 billion part loirs, a value
considered to be unattainable within the scheduk• and resources available. The need for
a better understanding of failure effects and the need for alternate design approaches were
clearly indicated.
Electronic parts, in general, have a constant failure rate. Since the major con-
cern was continuous ui,interrupted operation of the Acceptance Checkout Equipment sub-
sequent to the early failure or debugging period, the estimate of the probability or rela-
tive frequency of failure was best described by an exponential failure distribution
R (t) = e- k t rather than a gamma distribution. The inherent reliability R (t) or survival
probability in a system is expressed in terms of its constant inherent failure rate Oand
period of system operation (t) by the followi.ig equation:
R (t) = e - ^ t
The mathematical model expressing the relationship between parts and system reliabili-
tics is simply the "product rule," expressed in the following equation:
n	 n
R (t)	 11	 R  (t)	 I I e-fi t = CAL = c-t/q	 (1)
i = 1	 i=1
where R (t) = system reliability at time t
Ri (t) = part i reliability at time t
n
k i = system failure rate (since the
i = 1
	
exponents of an exponential
product are additive)
^i = part i failure rate
n - nUmber of parts
t = operating time
9 = mean life
The chief concern in the part selection program was to rcuuce, to an absolute mini-
mum, the catastrophic part failure rates during period constant failure rate.
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6Ill
	 the ACE-S/C system configuration, consideration was also given to
the following:
1. Utilization of existing equipment, and determination of the best configuration
commensurale ^ •jith the consequence of failure.
2. Improvement of existing egLJpment to minimize inherent failure rate.
3. Complete redesign of critical systems to meet the overall system reliability
goal.
4. Uliliz.ilion of selective redundancy with existing equipment.
5. A cowbination of these approaches.
At the time of preliminary design, a reliability predictive phase was initiated. The
use of accepted formulas and physical parameters was based oil balance between the
physical world with its demonstrated empirical features and the formulation of theoretical
models which allowed the development of a first-order design. Subsequently, the design
parameters were adjubted to adequately treat the problem of catastrophic failure ill
 parts. Also recognized was the fact that a part could fail to adjust to its circuit
condition and environment; it could fail in random fashion long after compatibility had
been established, or it could fail in fatigue through time and usage. All such failures
entail Irreversible processes which require part replacement to establish normal coll-
diLions, as contrasted with performance degradations which are often reversible II1 IlatUre,
allowing readjustment but not replacement. Therefore, when, through the reliability pre-
diction teclim(Itle, critical parts were identified as single failure points, and when the
Iuodeling exercise demonstrated a limitation of adjustment to either the part failure rate
or design parameters, the only other avenue of system reliability improvement was to
establish redmid.lnt functions.
Also recognized was the fact that latent defects, primary and/or complementary
desiyn errors, or irreversible failure modes (if present ill
	 the primary path and the
redundant path) would yield all
	 reliability performance significantly less than
initially planned. III view of the above and of the limited time available for development,
the technique of ImicLional asywimcLrical redundancy was employed ill
	 critical
a.roas to ensure compatible paths of operation as shown ill
	 7 and Reference 3.
It is accepted practice that redundancy is not a substitute for good design. While
it is true that the reliabi:ity of some critical components will almost always be too low
for use ill 	 simple (non-redundant) system, it is possible to develop a system configura-
tion for high reliability by incorporating redundant comoonents and/or redundant functions.
The major task was to obtain all 	 trade-off between the reliability of the system
operating modes and oerkrmance, weight, space, cost, availability, maintainability,
mid other criticai constraints .
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•Early in the design phase, it ^%, as discovered that improperly applied redundancy not
only added to system complexity and equipment costs but also substantially increased the
probability of mission faiiure due to the increase in "passive single j )aths" (e.g. wiring,
ducting, etc.). For redundancies to be meaningful, it must be possible to utilize them
nnornflnn.illV witll ' n a. Mer y shnrf Limp frnmr, aftar Flinn nrimo nnitimmn„ f is 	 1 F L
inoperative (Figure 7).
It is significant that the first reliability analysis revealed that major s..i`^systems,
as initially configured (Figure S), would have 1-hear equivalent MTu F 's of less than
100 hours. This would result in a total system reliability cf less Lh-ii 25 hours, which
wa-, unacceptahle since a 1-11our equivalent IMITBF of 2,000 hours vias required. The
predictive technique employed the equation R (t) = e-^ t v:tlich yielded MTBF's that
an,iaarp rl f0n
 I-A., and were further complicating the design process. Based on the experi-
ence of the design team, the value of equatiuii (1) was multiplied by 4 for equipment
currently in production and constructed of solid-state components. This value then
became the basis for further design analysis.
After adjustment of the prediction process and optimization of the equipment design,
the projected ground checkout station equipment 1-11our equivalent MTBF was approxi-
mately 1,000 hours. This was below the system requirement of 2,000 hours and did
not include the data I inks and the spacecraft vicinity equipment. By use of a conserva-
tive design approach, independent subsystems, built-in self-check capability, and the
requirement of two checkout stations operating in parallel, it was possible to predict
operatioial continuity despite localized component or subsystem failure (Figure S). The
reliabil i ty analysis indicated that the crime data lines required a 20-percent backup
capability to meet the reliability goals. This is based on the calculated reliability of
one transmission line as analyzed against the need for all ten lines being operational at
any given time. The system reliability design philosophy and procedure used to deter-
mine backup capability was the classical approach. Having established the reliability
goals and failure rates for each functional part within the proposed configuration, a pre-
diction model was developed to determi:,^ the necessary redundancy. A partial list of
predicted values is p resented in Figure 9 along with observed MTBF's.
	 i
While the overall system contains redundant functions as well as redundant sta-
tions, the prediction of the line reliability involved consideration of the availability allo-
cation probiem of ten lines being operational. The principal parts ar;d failure rates were
determined. A computation of the time required for the maintenance of each part was then
made to determine the expected maintenance time for the prime data Iines. Theis, the
probability of having ten good lines out of "n" total lines to obtain an overall reliability
of 0.9995 (regardless of the order of failure occ,,rrence for mutually exclusive events)
was calculated by using the binomial distribution.
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The equatwir for the binomial distribution is as follows:
f (x)
	
n 
px (n-x) _ _ q !-
x)
	
x (n-x)
where: f (x) is the probability density distribution function
x = operational lines
n = total number of lines
p = probability of successful operation
q = probability of a failure that would degrade the system
reliability
This means that ten lines and two spare lines are required to better the 0.9995
system reliability requirements. Further, the analysis revealed that the incorporation
of selective component redundancy in the spacecraft peripheral equipment would be
required to meet the reliability goals.
Once the configuration and optimum arrangement had been achieved and hardware
became available, it was logical to concentrate upon maximum component reliability. A
vigorous field evaluation with accurate and tiwely nonconformance reporting resulted in
meaningful corrective action. Each failure was analyzed and tracked to determine corn-
ponent characteristics of sensitivity or insensitivity to the usage environments. When
a group of parts exhibited an abnormal failure rate, they were removed. Then it was
observed that by continuous failure screening the remaining population of component
failures diminished in a linear fashion. Those wearout failures characterized by irre-
versible processes with only moderate periods of time were provided for by imposing
low stresses and developing a parts replacement plan which removes these parts just
short of the impending wearout phase. This allows the assumption that in the ACE-S/C,
only a constant failure rate exists in the system.
CONCLUSION
The manned Apollo Program is based upon maximum use of man's unique capabili-
ties such as observation, analysis, decision-making, and control, while simultaneously
relieving him of any tasks which could be better accomplished by machine. The utiliza-
tion of this: concept resulted in flight and ground-based system efficiency and flexibility
Which could not have been attained otherwise, and which exceeded tine capabilities that
could be attained in a fully automatic system.
The applications of the principles involved have been illustrated in the discussion
of the ACE-S/C subsystem. The operational capabilities of the ACE-S/C subsystem
include the acquisition of data, its running collation with all pertinent stored historical
information, mechanical analyses, and immediate display in a meaningful manner and in
such rapid sequence to a specialized human monitor, that the illusion of real-time
22
6operation is created. Monitors are representatives of systems engineering groups and
maintain Bill control of all checkout operations at all times. Tile monitoring operation
puts them in a position to advise the astronaut oil to utilize his flight equipment in
the most efficient manner.
RuliabiiiLy cunbiderdtions were given nigh priorities throughout all phases of design
and development of the ACE-S/C subsystems. Tile success of the hardware performance
confirms the effectiveness of the reliability effort and establishes a baselin.- for future
development programs.
The technical capabilities developed in the ACE-S/C subsystem have applications
beyond the Space Program to many major problems facing our society. The transfer of
technology from the Space Program by the application of these techniques to civilian
earthbound systems can result in appreciable benefits.
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